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Senin, 07 Mei 2012

Old foes haven't changed stripes: Keller v. Baird 12 years after Roy Criner's pardon

With Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Sharon Keller facing the only contested general election race among her colleagues (she faces Democrat Keith Hampton in a sleepy but potentially significant contest), and former CCA and District Judge Charlie Baird running as a Democratic challenger for Travis County District Attorney (against incumbent Rosemary Lehmberg), Grits was interested to run across this pair of old interviews of the two former colleagues with PBS Frontline regarding the Roy Criner case, which was essentially Texas' first DNA exoneration, though he was freed by executive pardon rather than the courts. Here's what the two judges had to say about the case back then.
Criner's liberation opened the door for the dozens of DNA exonerations the state has witnessed since, but because Governor Bush pardoned Criner, the case didn't change much about the court's jurisprudence. Sharon Keller won the debate on the court, even if she lost it in the court of public opinion. She convinced a majority of CCA judges to side with her against Charlie Baird, but the following year the Legislature created the state's DNA testing statute in rebuke (Ch. 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). When the courts upheld prosecutorial objections to DNA testing, the Legislature came back in 2011, at the recommendation of the Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions and removed most grounds for opposing testing when the evidence could be probative.

What stands out most to me looking at these interviews more than a decade hence is how little Judge Keller has changed her views on innocence and post-conviction writs, and what a tremendous influence her thinking has had on the court. Criner's pardon didn't change the court's ruling, and Judge Keller's arguments back then against exonerating Criner based on DNA were essentially similar to the arguments a more recent 5-4 majority used to keep from granting habeas writs when a conviction was based on junk science. Judge Keller told Frontline:
This DNA test gives negative, not positive, evidence. It would not have made a difference in the jury's verdict. . . Nobody knows for sure. But no state ever says, "I'm not sure. Let's just give him a new trial." Before trial, it's up to the state to prove that he's guilty. Now, it's up to him to prove that he's innocent. That's his burden under the law: Has he unquestionably established that he's innocent?
This is the same argument as in Ex Parte Robbins, where a 5-4 majority including Keller declared that testimony by a medical examiner had "not been proven false" even though the medical examiner (ME) herself and numerous other experts concurred that her trial testimony had presented wrong conclusions unsupported by science to the jury. The district judge had recommended granting a habeas writ, finding that the recanting ME's "opinions were the sole bases of the State's case as to cause and manner of death, without which the State would not have obtained a conviction."

But using the same logic as they did to deny Roy Criner, Keller and Co.denied habeas relief even in the face of a complete lack of inculpatory evidence. The court's own precedents say a conviction may only be overturned if "no reasonable juror" would support it after considering the new evidence. In Robbins' case, the recanted testimony was the "sole" basis for the conviction, but the court ruled its falsity insufficient to overturn the conviction. I can't imagine what "reasonable juror" they're envisioning, but such is the Kellerite logic dominating the majority on today's Court of Criminal Appeals.

You see the same misshapen logic deployed in other arenas dominated by prosecutors, as with the Todd Willingham case at the Forensic Science Commission. The trial testimony about fire and arson was all hokum, it was the only directly inculpatory evidence presented to the jury, but Williamson County DA John Bradley insisted that just because there's no evidence of arson doesn't mean it couldn't have happened. Problem is, the jury wasn't told it "could" have happened; they were told the "fire doesn't lie." This is the precedential ghost of Roy Criner's case, further evidence that Sharon Keller's consistent if often invisible hand is still guiding the state down the same dark path that left the court humiliated in Criner and a national laughingstock. Rather than learn from the experience, Keller and Co. and the hard-line prosecutors whose interests they represent chose to double down and do everything in their power to prevent future science-based exonerations, culminating in the Willingham fiasco and Ex Parte Robbins.

Judge Baird, by contrast, for his dissent in Criner and his decision to speak out about it upon leaving the court, merits recognition as virtually the father of Texas DNA exonerations. It was his testimony before Congress that brought a national spotlight to the case, leading Republican Sen. Orrin Hatch to call the court's ruling "outrageous." Unlike Judge Keller, Baird acknowledged how it would impact jurors' decision if, instead of pointing to guilt, scientific evidence showed the defendant "didn't commit the offense -- at least, [he] didn't commit it under the theory the prosecution advanced at the trial."

When that happens, Judge Keller and the CCA majority think it appropriate for appellate judges to hypothesize other theories of the crime besides the one presented to jurors and suggest they "could" have found this or that alternative convincing. They could have, one supposes, but the case presented to the jury is the basis for appeals, not imaginary alternatives.

Baird, by contrast said of the Keller court's Criner decision, "What they have done, and I think improperly so, is to create or invent reasons that explain away the DNA evidence. But those reasons were never presented to a jury, and that's the basis of the entire judicial system -- you put those facts before 12 individual citizens, and let them decide if that evidence is reliable and believable, or not." One could say the same thing about the Willingham case as well as Ex Parte Robbins. To sustain the verdict would require supposition outside the bounds of what was actually argued at trial.

Keller's virulent pro-death penalty rhetoric and rulings on the court ("We close at 5," etc.) get the most attention from all the culture warriors, but IMO it's the string of cases from  Criner to Robbins that represents perhaps her most lasting and harmful achievement. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was going to be pro-death penalty no matter who sat on it, but Presiding Judge Sharon Keller (and her colleagues populating the court's extremist wing) are responsible for this odd, anti-science bent to Texas' innocence/habeas jurisprudence.

Kamis, 19 April 2012

'As good as DNA'? Court of Criminal Appeals considers dog-scent lineups

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals yesterday heard arguments in a murder case where the conviction hinged primarily on a "scent lineup" conducted by former Fort Bend Sheriff's Deputy Keith Pikett, a rare forensic technique first developed in Communist countries that has been derided as junk science. The CCA already overturned the conviction of the defendant's father in a case arising out of the same episode. Here's the initial coverage:
From the Statesman:
In the years since [Megan Winfrey's conviction], a number of scientists and dog experts have denounced Pikett's methods as unethical, unprofessional and biased in favor of law enforcement.

At least one member of the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed. "Personally, I think the dog-scent stuff, particularly as done by Pikett, is junk science and should never have come into court," Judge Cheryl Johnson said.
Absurdly, prosecutors told jurors at trial that the dog-scent lineup was "as good as DNA." Winfrey's attorney, Shirley Baccus-Lobel, told the CCA that "The problem with bad science masquerading as science is it results in attaching a significance to unremarkable events." San Jacinto County prosecutors told the court that although the case was circumstantial and "parts of it are weak," they should uphold the conviction anyway. (I know, you're shocked.)

See also earlier coverage from the Tribune, and these prior, related Grits posts:

Jumat, 23 Maret 2012

Competency restoration: Clinical vs. forensic assessments

One often hears folks in the system say that, though it's lamentable to use jails as a substitute for mental health treatment, at least sick people get services there. Seldom discussed, though, is that the process begins with a concerted effort to prove that mentally ill defendants are not, in fact, sick so they can be shown competent to stand trial. A presentation this morning at the Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit's mental health seminar by Dr. Bryan Scott - who assesses defendants' competency for Bexar County - identified some of the key distinctions between his forensic role and that of a clinical diagnostician, both in his discussion and his own demeanor and attitude toward the work.

Scott emphasized the radical differences between the role of a forensic mental health examiner vs. clinical psychologist psychiatrist. In a clinical assessment, he would typically run down a checklist of symptoms: Do you hear voices, etc.? In a forensic setting, he said, he doesn't interrogate symptoms, assuming malingerers would cop to all of them. but instead lets defendants bring symptoms to him. And when they do, he views them very skeptically, with his main task - and to hear him tell it the most "fun" part of the job - that of rooting out alleged malingerers (I say "alleged" because in one prominent example he insisted a man was faking though a jury had overruled him).

For example, instead of listing possible real symptoms, Scott will often suggest phony symptoms (e.g., are symptoms worse when you lie down, stand up, urinate, etc.?) to trip them up if they agree with items not associated with the possible illness. Or he'd ask a series of 50/50 questions ("Does a cow have three legs or four? Is a quarter worth 25 cents or a dollar.? Many mentally ill people, he pointed out, will answer those questions just fine. If they get most wrong, not 50/50 as you might if guessing, he assumes they're likely malingering. So that line of questioning is aimed at tripping up malingerers and merely wasting the time of the actually sick, and is not something you'd see in a clinical assessment.

In some cases, things that might cause a clinical diagnostician to think a mental illness more likely, said Dr. Scott, may mitigate against him believing a defendant. For example, mental illness (particularly bipolar and schizophrenia) are to some extent inheritable, so a family history normally implies it's more likely a patient will have the same problem. In the case of defendants, though, Scott said if their mother suffered from schizophrenia, a malingerer might have more intimate knowledge of symptoms and be able to mimic them. For this reason, he considers family history both "a rule-in and a rule-out" criteria.

Another key difference, said Scott: Forensic examiners determining competency do not have a doctor-patient relationship, though he does tell defendants "I'm here to help you." But his role is "not therapeutic," said Scott, who said it's a "totally different role than seeing a patient." He's not there to get them treatment. There is "no confidentiality," and he lets them know that up front. Indeed, he said, often defense attorneys will sit in on the interviews. That alone is a huge difference between the mental health treatment in jail and out: Is the client the client, or is the court the client?

Scott emphasized he wasn't assessing mental illness per se but legal competency to stand trial, declaring "Just because someone is delusional doesn't mean they're incompetent."

Dr. Scott's gleeful tone as he recounted "tricks of the trade" for identifying (or at least accusing) malingerers was difficult to suppress, and mostly he didn't really try. I don't say that to criticize him, at least too harshly (though at times it did seem a bit much). Malingering happens and somebody has to try to root it out. I certainly don't envy the task. Problem is, everybody including the legitimately ill, who are processed through the system in large numbers, get treated as potential malingerers on the front end, where possible diagnoses aren't probed so much to identify problems as to find excuses to ignore them. What a strange, almost perverse aspect of the system.

Kamis, 22 Maret 2012

CCA Integrity Unit hosts capitol seminar on mental health

Today and tomorrow the Court of Criminal Appeals' Criminal Justice Integrity Unit is holding a two-day seminar on mental health at the capitol. (See a flyer [pdf] for the event.) If you haven't registered (I understand it's full), you can watch online beginning at 9 a.m. this morning; go to the Texas Senate's video page and scroll down to the "Court of Criminal Appeals Seminar," clicking on the Real Player icon to launch the broadcast once it begins. The first day focuses on substance abuse issues; tomorrow they'll cover competency restoration, involuntary commitment, and representing the mentally ill.

Sabtu, 10 Maret 2012

Keller tries to derail Keith Hampton's candidacy; Mark Bennett to challenge Hervey as Libertarian

It's a rare day when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals makes the news for anything but the occasional overzealous death penalty ruling or suborning some cockamamie brand of junk science, but this week brings two tidbits of electoral political news that merit attention: Republican Sharon Keller levied a challenge with the Democratic Party to the candidacy of her presumed opponent Keith Hampton, aiming to keep his name off the November ballot. And Mark Bennett, the Houston criminal defense attorney who blogs at Defending People, signed up as a Libertarian candidate to run against Judge Barbara Hervey in the fall.

Let's take these two in order of importance: Since her fellow CCA judge Larry Meyers decided at the last minute not to challenge Sharon Keller in the GOP primary (after previously announcing he would do so), eliminating Hampton in the courtroom instead of the ballot box would relieve voters of any option whatsoever for replacing Keller for a fourth term as Presiding Judge. Given that, here's hoping Keith Hampton got his act together on his signatures before the filing deadline and his candidacy is approved. See Hampton's press release responding to Keller's gambit.

As for Mark Bennett (visit his campaign site), Grits must confess disappointment that he signed up to run as Libertarian when there's no Democrat running against Republican Barbara Hervey. Bennett understatedly declared that "the Libertarian candidate in a race for a seat on the Court of Criminal Appeals faces a steep uphill battle." In reality, as a practical matter, the Libertarian candidate has entered into a political suicide pact. Bennett himself demonstrates why in a  post laying out vote results from 2008, the last CCA race coinciding with a presidential election:
Place 3:
Republican Incumbent
3,940,954
Democratic Candidate
3,477,426
Libertarian Candidate
215,427

Place 4:
Republican Incumbent
4,035,683
Democratic Candidate
3,336,944
Libertarian Candidate
249,921

Place 9:
Republican Incumbent
4,709,086
Libertarian Candidate
1,041,499
Your mileage may vary, but these downballot races barely run campaigns and do not typically spend money on paid media. Very few voters can even name a member of the Court of Criminal Appeals, much less meaningfully evaluate their record. And the MSM are lucky to devote one story per election to the race at any given outlet, with political reporters generally understanding as little about the court as the general public. As a result, CCA vote totals derive almost purely from party identification.

Let me step back for a moment to make clear that I respect Mark Bennett tremendously, both as an attorney (by reputation) and as a writer, and that's speaking as someone who may have read every single word he's written, or close to it, virtually since the day he began Defending People. He's a great guy and I think he'd make a terrific judicial candidate. Now let me proceed to chastise him, though merely on grounds of political naivete and perhaps a wee bit of selfishness, not ill intent.

(Grits should add that, despite my various policy differences with Judges Hervey and Keller, neither woman has ever been anything but extraordinarily gracious and polite toward me. Judge Keller seems like an authentically sweet person on a personal level, though admittedly she's never wanted to chit chat much, while I genuinely enjoy Judge Hervey's company. The fact that I'd like to see the voting bloc responsible for decisions like this one and this one broken up on the court doesn't mean I hold any personal animus toward either of them.)

Bennett tells us he chose to run for the Court of Criminal Appeals because the slot against Barbara Hervey was the only one statewide where Libertarians hadn't lined up a candidate. Well, guess what? That means that was the single race where - before Bennett filed as Libertarian - a candidate who seriously wanted to unseat Hervey and begin voting and writing opinions in her stead could have filed as a Democrat and had the best chance in more than a decade of unseating an incumbent statewide Republican.

Libertarian votes are protest votes - the electoral version of "none of the above." If there were no Libertarian candidate, most of those votes would go to the non-incumbent, which in Texas means to the Democrat, or else those folks just wouldn't vote at all. I've always inferred from the large Libertarian vote in CCA races that there's a disproportionate amount of dissatisfaction with the Court of Criminal Appeals among voters under Sharon Keller's leadership, or else why would the Libertarian totals get so high when a Dem is absent? In other races where Rs run unopposed by a D, L totals are typically much lower.

So Bennett's candidacy in Grits' estimation represents not a cause for celebration but a missed opportunity to unseat a member of the court faction who, with Judge Keller, has systematically slanted the court's jurisprudence far to the pro-prosecution end of the spectrum. That said, Judge Hervey - both in several notable opinions and her work with the Criminal Justice Integrity Unit - has distinguished herself as more thoughtful and slightly less hard-line than Sharon Keller, but in the scheme of things the two women's records aren't all that different, particularly compared to where a Mark Bennett might come down on the issues.

Bennett nobly announces that "I don’t want a single vote from anyone who can’t explain to me what my job will be if I’m elected." Translation: He doesn't actually want to be elected. Why would he, since he grants elsewhere that "getting elected would entail a brutal pay cut"? Sure, as Bennett declared on Defending People, this is "an office in which [he] could do real and lasting good." But the harsh truth is if the goal was to get on the court and do good instead of just talk about it, he'd have run as a Democrat or in the GOP primary.

Running quixotic campaigns for office to "educate" the public about this or that subject or to "send a message" is about as ineffective a tactic imaginable, substituting a single candidate's personal ambition for the policy goals of whatever ideals one hopes to champion. The only reason to run for office is to try to win, because power comes with winning and elections are how we decide who gets to wield it. That's all it's about. If you want to "educate" people, write on your blog or even better, use the money you were going to spend on a campaign on paid advertising to promote your message. More people will receive it that way.

Grits has opined for years that the CCA races (and to a lesser extent, the Texas Supreme Court) are the Texas elections where Dems have far and away the best chance of unseating a statewide Republican. Bennett notes that "in the closest 2008 Court of Criminal Appeals Race there was more than a 200,000-voter difference (that is, the result would have been different only if more than 200,000 voters had [switched their votes]) between the winner and second place." That's not an insurmountable margin, particularly compared to other statewide races, if a serious candidate were to run an actual, well-resourced campaign.  If there were no Libertarian candidate and most of those L protest votes went to the D challenger, the race tightens up considerably. In an R v. L matchup, though, the risk of success is a null set. Bennett's lotto numbers have a better chance of coming up.

Keith Hampton, however, has a puncher's chance to defeat Sharon Keller if he can make it onto the ballot, particularly in a year where conservative voters could stay home if Mitt Romney is the GOP presidential nominee. That's where the real action lies, to the extent it's possible for any Dem to win a statewide race in Texas at this historical juncture. Bennett's candidacy will be fun for his readers - and I hope for him - but regrettably inconsequential.

Selasa, 28 Februari 2012

Executing innocents still okay after SCOTUS cert denial; will Texas take them up on it?

Like Pontius Pilate washing his hands of the dispute, the US Supreme Court yesterday declined to consider the question of whether the US Constitution permits the execution of an innocent person if the government has not violated their due process rights. The issue could have been taken up in the Texas death-penalty case of Larry Swearingen, but SCOTUS denied cert (i.e., they refused to hear it). Reports Bloomberg News:
Questions about the constitutionality of executing an innocent person are a “brooding omnipresence” in federal law that have “been left unanswered for too long,” Judge Jacques Wiener wrote in a 2009 ruling on Swearingen at the New Orleans- based 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Swearingen’s appeal “might be the very case” for the Supreme Court “to recognize actual innocence as a ground for federal habeas relief,” Wiener wrote.

Swearingen was sentenced to die for the murder of 19-year- old Melissa Trotter, a college student who disappeared on Dec. 8, 1998, and was missing for 25 days before her body was discovered in Sam Houston National Forest, north of Houston.

Swearingen, who knew Trotter and was seen with her on the day she disappeared, was considered a suspect early in the police investigation. He was arrested Dec. 11, 1998, on unrelated warrants and has been in jail ever since.

Swearingen’s lawyers say forensic specialists -- including the medical examiner who testified for the prosecution -- have looked at evidence that wasn’t considered at Swearingen’s trial and now agree that Trotter’s body was placed in the forest no earlier than Dec. 18, 1998, a week after Swearingen’s arrest.

More than that, Swearingen’s lawyers say medical examiners who looked at tissue samples say Trotter’s internal organs were in a condition suggesting that she was killed no more than several days before her body was found.

The Innocence Network, an umbrella group of more than 60 organizations that helps prisoners uncover favorable evidence, said in a friend-of-the-court brief that Swearingen has “an airtight alibi -- he was in jail when the victim was murdered.”

Imposing the death penalty on someone who isn’t guilty of a capital crime, Swearingen’s lawyers said, would violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment and the 14th Amendment’s due process protections.

Texas authorities said strands of Trotter’s hair were found in Swearingen’s truck, and fibers matching Swearingen’s jacket, bedroom carpet and truck upholstery were found on Trotter’s clothing. Cleaning Swearingen’s trailer after Trotter’s body was discovered, the suspect’s landlord found part of a torn pair of pantyhose that, prosecutors said, matched hosiery used to strangle the victim.

Swearingen’s case involves rules for habeas corpus petitions, which let federal judges intervene in criminal cases if there is reason to believe an inmate’s rights have been violated.
For readers interested in more detail, Jordan Smith at the Austin Chronicle last year had an excellent, detailed article explicating the new forensic evidence in the case.

The question is, can habeas corpus reviews by appellate judges only examine procedural questions or if defendants can ask for relief simply based on actual innocence, as in, "I didn't do it." The issue is most poignant in capital cases like Swearingen's where the punishment is permanent, but the implications are even more far reaching.

While it almost seems offensive to say the Constitution permits the execution of an innocent person, as Bloomberg News put it, "as the law now stands, even uncontested scientific proof of innocence isn’t a valid reason for a federal judge to stop an execution." It remains thus with this disappointing SCOTUS non-decision. (Of course, the Constitution's authors envisioned that a robust pardon power would prevent such injustices, but Goveror Rick Perry's pardon record provides only glimmers of hope that that might happen in Swearingen's case.)

In addition to the hot-button culture-war question of whether the Constitution permits executing the innocent, Swearingen's case also implicates Texas habeas law. The Court of Criminal Appeals belatedly ordered a hearing on the new scientific evidence, which coincidentally began in Houston yesterday. Reported the Houston Chronicle:
An expert entomologist testified for the defense Monday that insect evidence used in Swearingen's murder trial was improperly collected and stored, making it impossible to correctly estimate the time of death of the 19-year-old victim, Melissa Trotter.

The testimony came during a hearing ordered by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals after it granted Swearingen a reprieve on July 28. He was set to die by lethal injection on Aug. 18.

State District Judge Fred Edwards must review new evidence dealing with heart and liver tissue and a due process violation. Edwards will submit his findings to the appeals court, which will decide if Swearingen should receive a new trial.
Depending on the outcome of that hearing, perhaps this case will give the CCA an opportunity to overturn their despicable misstep in Ex Parte Robbins.

What a remarkable case. SCOTUS chickened out on addressing perhaps the most high-stakes question in constitutional law, which leaves the matter in the hands of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and thereafter quite literally at the mercy of the Board of Pardons and Paroles and Gov. Perry.

This is not the Todd Willingham case where new expert testimony was elicited at the last moment when courts and the Governor had little time to consider it. If Swearingen is executed despite hard scientific evidence of actual innocence, it will have happened following a slow, deliberate process whereby, from Washington to Austin, those responsible for ensuring the integrity of the system chose to look the other way.

Kamis, 09 Februari 2012

CCA laments 'disconnect between changing science and reliable verdicts' it helped create

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals yesterday ordered an evidentiary hearing in the habeas writ application of Hannah Overton, the Corpus Christi woman convicted of capital murder for allegedly forcing large amounts of salt down her son's throat. Her case was featured recently in Texas Monthly, where reporter Pam Colloff cited experts criticizing the forensics underlying the case and  concluded Overton may have been innocent. In a statement accompanying the order, Judge Cathy Cochran wrote:
The judiciary must be ever vigilant to ensure that verdicts in criminal cases are based solely upon reliable, relevant scientific evidence-scientific evidence that will hold up under later scrutiny. I have previously expressed my concern about "the fundamental disconnect between the worlds of science and of law." Ex parte Robbins, No. AP-76464, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2011 WL 2555665 at *19 (Tex. Crim. App. June 29, 2011) (Cochran, J., dissenting).

This disconnect between changing science and reliable verdicts that can stand the test of time has grown in recent years as the speed with which new science and revised scientific methodologies debunk what had formerly been thought of as reliable forensic science has increased. The potential problem of relying on today's science in a criminal trial (especially to determine an essential element such as criminal causation or the identity of the perpetrator) is that tomorrow's science sometimes changes and, based upon that changed science, the former verdict may look inaccurate, if not downright ludicrous. But the convicted person is still imprisoned. Given the facts viewed in the fullness of time, today's public may reasonably perceive that the criminal justice system is sometimes unjust and inaccurate. Finality of judgment is essential in criminal cases, but so is accuracy of the result--an accurate result that will stand the test of time and changes in scientific knowledge.

Id. The problem in this case, as in Robbins, is not that the science itself has evolved, but that it is alleged that the scientific testimony at the original trial was not fully informed and did not take into account all of the scientific evidence now available
Grits cannot help but point out that saying scientific testimony in Robbins "was not fully informed" is quite the understatement. According to Judge Elsa Alcala's dissent in Robbins, the scientific findings in that case were "based on false pretenses of competence, objectivity, and underlying pathological reasoning, and were not given in good faith." A lower-court judge had characterized the disputed testimony as "expert fiction calculated to attain a criminal conviction." The euphemism "not fully informed" soft-pedals state misconduct to the point of whitewashing it.

Similarly, another problem in Overton's case, unmentioned by Judge Cochran but reported by Pam Colloff at Texas Monthly, was that potentially exculpatory evidence about the victim's stomach contents wasn't turned over to the defense. In any event, Colloff concluded, "A more thorough investigation would have uncovered ample evidence to suggest that [Overton's son] had an undiagnosed eating disorder, raising the possibility that he had unintentionally consumed too much salt on his own."

Stepping back from the individual case, this is an example of the CCA struggling with the misbegotten progeny of Ex Parte Robbins (discussed by Grits here , by Liberty and Justice for Y'all here, and mentioned by Judge Cochran, who to her credit dissented, in the excerpt above). Cochran's order expressed the problem particularly powerfully and succinctly: The Robbins and Overton cases highlight how a "disconnect between changing science and reliable verdicts that can stand the test of time has grown in recent years as the speed with which new science and revised scientific methodologies debunk what had formerly been thought of as reliable forensic science has increased." Well stated.

Judge Cochran's conclusion could apply equally well to the Legislature as to judges, both of whom must struggle to apply antiquated statutes and legal concepts to new scientific settings: "These are not easy issues," she wrote, "but fairness both to the applicant who is serving a sentence of life without parole and to the state and the memory of the child victim demands that our verdicts will withstand the rest of time such that the guilty are punished and the innocent are not. Further, public support of the American criminal justice system depends upon its confidence that the courts reach accurate verdicts based upon reliable scientific evidence." (Thank you, Judge, for saying it.)

To justify that confidence, both the courts and the Legislature must focus more on reducing or eliminating the growing "disconnect between changing science and reliable verdicts," as Cochran put it. It's good when courts acknowledge that disconnect; the question now becomes how to rationalize the law so that legal and scientific truth don't so quickly and easily diverge amidst the vicissitudes of criminal prosecutions and appeals? On that subject, the law hasn't yet caught up to the science, at least regarding post-conviction habeas writs. Maybe the Overton case will give the CCA a chance to improve their pathetic stance from Robbins, but in the meantime the Lege in 2013 should step in to clarify in the statute that junk science can still be challenged post-conviction.

How many other situations are there where, in Cochran's words, the "verdict may look inaccurate, if not downright ludicrous," in light of modern science, "But the convicted person is still imprisoned"? Nobody knows for sure. Too often, nobody in power appears particularly anxious to find out. At least in this case the court ordered further inquiry, to their credit. And the inquiry raises the profile of this legal/scientific "disconnect" that's become a recurring theme in and perhaps the central challenge confronting 21st century forensic science.

MORE: From Pam Colloff at Texas Monthly, who writes that Judge Cochran's:
statement comes in the wake of a number of high-profile DNA exonerations and reflects the court’s growing unease with the capriciousness of scientific evidence in the courtroom.

It also shows an evolution in Cochran’s thinking. Her 2002 ruling in the case of former death row inmate Anthony Graves—who was released in 2010 after eighteen years behind bars for a crime he did not commit—set Graves’s appeals back years. In the Graves case, Cochran ruled that a defendant was entitled to a qualified court-appointed attorney, but not necessarily to one who performed well.

Clearly, Cochran is deeply troubled by circumstantial cases like Hannah’s that may rest on flawed science.

Sabtu, 28 Januari 2012

TX conviction overturned because of failure to challenge junk sciene in child death case

Via PBS Frontline and ProPublica, a conviction for the death of a child was overturned this week by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals because the defendant's attorney failed to challenge bogus medical evidence presented in the penalty phase of the case that the infant had been sexually assaulted:
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals [on Wednesday] set aside the conviction of Ernie Lopez, an Amarillo man found guilty in 2003 of sexually assaulting six-month-old Isis Vas. The baby died shortly after the purported attack.

Lopez has been serving a term of 60 years in Texas prison for the crime. But a joint reporting effort by ProPublica, NPR, and PBS "Frontline" last year explored the possibility that Lopez might be innocent.
In the years since Lopez's trial, a host of physicians have reviewed the medical evidence in the case, raising questions about the soundness of his conviction. Many of these specialists have come to believe that Vas actually died of natural causes, and that Lopez never assaulted the child at all.

During a tearful prison interview, the inmate insisted he wasn’t a sex offender and killer. "That's not my character," he said. "That's not who I am."

"We are very pleased with the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to set aside Ernie’s conviction," said one of Lopez’s attorneys, Heather Kirkwood, in an email. "The Texas courts deserve ample recognition for the careful review of the record that led to today’s decision."

The Lopez case highlights the growing international controversy about the reliability of the science used to prosecute cases of fatal child abuse and sexual assault. In Canada and the U.S. at least 23 people have been wrongly accused of killing children based on questionable medical evidence, and California Gov. Jerry Brown is currently considering commuting the sentence of a grandmother convicted of fatally shaking her 7-week-old grandson.

The Texas court didn’t rule on Lopez’s culpability and did not set him free. Instead, the court concluded that Lopez received ineffective legal representation during his trial because his lawyers failed to challenge the prosecution’s medical evidence. 
UPDATE: The Potter County DA says he will re-prosecute the case.

Selasa, 20 Desember 2011

Mental health, substance abuse, and the integrity of criminal justice

The next meeting of Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Barbara Hervey's Criminal Justice Integrity Unit has been set and addresses an issue I'm sure will interest many Grits readers beyond the innocence questions taken up by the CJIU so far. From the email:
THE TEXAS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTEGRITY UNIT
 
In conjunction with:
Senator John Carona’s Office
Senator Rodney Ellis’s Office
Center for American and International Law
Texas Center for the Judiciary
Texas District & County Attorneys Association
Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association
 
Presents The
MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE SEMINAR

March 22-23, 2012
Texas State Capitol Auditorium (E1.004)
Tuition is FREE for All Registrants
 Be there or be square.

Sabtu, 17 Desember 2011

The Dissenters: Which TX appellate judges author dissents? (Hint: Sharon Keller writes the most)

Presiding Judge Sharon Keller of the Court of Criminal Appeals authored more dissenting opinions in FY2011 than any other Texas appellate judge, Grits was surprised to discover. According to data (xls) from the Office of Court Administration annual report, dissenting opinions are incredibly rare among Texas appellate courts, and only a handful of justices author most of them, Grits' analysis found. Here's a list of the number of dissents at each Texas appellate court in the year ending Aug. 31, 2011, listing every justice who authored more than two dissents:
1st Court (Houston): 32
Terry Jennings: 6
Evelyn Keyes: 4
Jim Sharp, Jr.: 17

2nd Court (Fort Worth): 21
Lee Ann Dauphinot: 13

3rd Court (Austin): 17
Jan Patterson: 3
David Puryear: 5
Diane Henson: 3

4th Court (San Antonio): 4

5th Court (Dallas): 4
Mary Murphy: 4

6th Court (Texarkana): 3
Jack Carter: 3

7th Court (Amarillo): 2

8th Court (El Paso): 0

9th Court (Beaumont): 5
David Gaultney: 4

10th Court (Waco): 6
Chief Justice Thomas Gray: 4

11th Court (Eastland): 1

12th Court (Tyler): 0

13th Court (Corpus Christi): 8

14th Court (Houston): 21
John Anderson: 3
Kern Thompson Frost: 7
Tracy Christopher: 4

Total dissents by Texas Court of Appeals justices: 124
Total original opinions on merits: 6,199
Chief Justice Thomas Gray at the 10th Court may have the reputation as the state's most ardent dissenter among appellate judges, but by the numbers he's certainly not among the most frequent, or wasn't last year.

At the Court of Criminal Appeals (pdf), similarly, a handful of judges, led by Presiding Judge Sharon Kelle, accounted for most dissents authored on the court:
Keller: 20
Price: 9
Meyers: 8
Johnson: 4
Cochran:  2
Alcala: 2
Keasler: 1
Hervey: 1
Holcomb: 0*
Womack: 0

*Replaced by Alcala this summer.
No Texas Supreme Court Justice authored more than 6 dissents (Phil Johnson).

That said, how should one interpret this data? Are more dissents a good or bad thing? It depends, of course, on the dissent and the dissenter. A jurist who never dissents may just be going along to get along, refusing to assert principle when it's called for. By the same token, there are advantages to judges signing onto an opinion in order to influence its nuance when it becomes obvious dissenters don't have votes to prevail. In Judge Keller's case, the (relatively) large number of dissents may represent growing frustration as she's begun to lose her once-iron grip on the court to a nascent plurality of still-conservative but more independent thinkers. It's probably impossible to generalize. I just found the disparities interesting and thought other court-watchers might too.

Kamis, 08 Desember 2011

Two candidates against Judge Sharon Keller must unleash attack dogs to win

Photo via US Marines' official Flickr acount
The most interesting statewide political race in Texas next year that no one's talking about are twin challenges to Judge Sharon Keller on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, both from within the GOP by one of her colleagues, Larry Meyers, and in the general election by criminal defense attorney Keith Hampton. Here's Meyer's campaign website and here's Keith Hampton's, along with a recent campaign email from the Austin Democrat. Hampton had originally announced he'd run against rookie incumbent Judge Elsa Alcala, but switched races in order to challenge Keller (or Meyers if he upsets her in the primary).

Judge Keller, the self-styled, "pro-prosecution" judge, has so much baggage coming in it'd be hard to know where to attack first. The findings of facts against her by the Commission on Judicial Conduct were damning and provide ample fodder for campaign attacks. (Her punishment was overturned as illegal but the findings of fact on the merits remained untouched in a circus-like tragicomedy that embarrassed the court and the state.) Keller was also fined by the Ethics Commission $100,000 for failing to disclose a vast web of financial entanglements. (See the ruling [pdf].)

Even more than those dark moments, though, many of her opinions and dissents contain jaw-dropping pro-government assumptions that could be mined for anti-populist material that would make any good Tea-Party type cringe. Just as Governor Perry's greatest political achievement has been to maximize power over state agencies through appointments of political allies, creating a (relatively) strong executive where Texas historically had a weak one, Judge Keller's principal achievement as the CCA's Presiding Judge has been to oversee (and arguably principally author) an expansionist accumulation of government power by law enforcement and prosecutors over nearly two decades. A comprehensive vetting of her opinions by a campaign researcher would yield lots of attack fodder. But these campaigns must undertake that work, then use the information to construct and deliver political attacks: That's the piece that I'm not sure is going to happen, though there's still time.

I'd be happy to see either challenger unseat Judge Keller. To borrow a phrase from Judge Michael McSpadden, speaking recently of Harris County DA Pat Lykos, Keith Hampton and I "are not close, and in fact probably don't like each other," but he'd be a welcome breath of fresh air on the court if he pulled off the longshot upset. Judge Meyers probably faces shorter odds than Hampton at unseating Keller, but so far he hasn't run much of a campaign, that I've seen. He's been on the court forever and in many respects his record as judge isn't much better than Keller's. But he'd surely be a less ideological and polarizing a figure, and if he runs a smart, well-funded campaign he stands a puncher's chance to beat Keller in a primary.

That's just what it is, though: A puncher's chance. And as a political-consultant friend of mine likes to say, "you don't win a fistfight without throwing any punches." Judge Keller is surely the betting favorite to win reelection next year as I write this. If either of these men wants to beat her, they're going to need to attack, hard, and put significant resources behind those attacks. Otherwise the race will garner no attention nor interest amidst the 7-dwarves in the GOP presidential primary and a (theoretically) competitive US Senate race for Kay Bailey Hutchison's seat on the ballot in March. And in the November election, of course, the presidential race will drive turnout and (if history is any guide) drown out discussions of tertiary races like this one.

Judicial races are generally sleepy affairs, but if one or preferably both of these challengers don't bring out the attack dogs, Sharon Keller will skate under the radar to reelection and another six-year term, despite all the embarrassment and divisiveness she's brought to the court.

Sabtu, 22 Oktober 2011

Mea culpa: Keller, Hervey surprise while Alcala prevails in absence

A reader sends Grits a note to "keep [me] honest," declaring "In your post from June 20, 2011 about Judge Alcala, you talk about an opinion in which she dissented while she was still at the 1st Court of Appeals." Readers may recall the piece he's discussing analyzed notable criminal opinions authored by rookie Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Elsa Alacala while she was an appellate judge on the First Court of Appeals in Houston. On the item in question, Grits had written:
In one of Alcala's rare dissents in a criminal case, she would have reversed and remanded a conviction because the trial court did not instruct the jury to consider the possibility of convicting only on a lesser included offense, since the jury could have plausibly inferred that the defendant was not in immediate flight when an assault occurred a half hour after a theft.  I don't suspect for a moment Judge Keller or Hervey on the CCA, for example, would have blinked before signing off on the majority opinion , but Alcala's dissent smartly parses the case law to make distinctions between the instant case and those cited by her colleagues affirming the decision." (emphasis added by my esteemed reader)
Continued my reader, "This case made it to the CCA, and an opinion written by Judge Hervey was handed down 3 days ago.  It actually affirmed Judge Alcala's dissenting opinion from the Court of Appeals. And it turns out you were wrong about Judges Keller and Hervey in this instance." Indeed! The case was overturned on those grounds and sent back to the lower courts for a harm analysis. Judge Hervey authored the opinion in the case, siding with Alcala's dissent (Alcala sat out arguments because she heard it at the appellate level).

So my apologies, Judge Keller and Hervey, for underestimating you, but congrats to Judge Alcala, whose arguments ruled the day even without the presence of her vote. And for what it's worth, I appreciate the reader "keeping [me] honest." My pessimism about the court was unfounded, at least in this case and indeed in several notable, recent rulings. In such matters, I'm pleasantly surprised to see evidence stack up contrary to my expectations. It's particularly nice to see because after Ex Parte Robbins this summer, your correspondent was getting a little jaded. Mea culpa.

Rabu, 19 Oktober 2011

'No sugar coating' prosecutorial miscondcuct in death penalty case

I received the following press release today from the ACLU Capital Punishment Project about alleged prosecutor misconduct in a death penalty case:
Due Process Demands Texas Man Who Maintains Innocence Be Given New Trial

The American Civil Liberties Union today argued before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that a man should be given a new trial because serious misconduct by a special prosecutor led to his capital conviction despite grave questions about his guilt.

Manuel Velez was sentenced to death in 2005 for the murder of a one-year-old boy based on the false testimony of his live-in girlfriend and mother of the child. The woman, Acela Moreno, failed to admit she had pleaded guilty to inflicting her son with head injuries the day he died. Medical experts made clear these injuries were consistent with those that led to the child’s death. At Velez’s trial, Moreno testified she pleaded guilty not to committing violence against the child but rather to having failed to alert authorities that Velez had allegedly been hurting the child.

The special prosecutor in the case negotiated the plea deal with Moreno and so knew she was covering up her own abuse of the child; indeed, he told the judge presiding at Moreno’s plea that she had injured the child.

But at Velez’s trial, he did nothing to set the record straight. He then presented Moreno’s false testimony as fact during closing arguments, repeating that she was guilty only of having failed to alert authorities.

“The Constitution requires that our judicial system be fundamentally fair, and this case was riddled with unfairness,” said Brian Stull, senior staff attorney with the ACLU Capital Punishment Project, who presented arguments in the case. “We should never be comfortable with sending a man to his death when we know that the state has relied on falsehood to convict him. In cases where the irreversible sanction of the death penalty is involved, it is imperative that due process be fully upheld to ensure that innocent people aren’t executed.”
Velez has maintained his innocence, there are no eyewitnesses accusing him of the crime and no forensic evidence links him to the murder.

Last week, three of the nation’s pre-eminent legal ethicists filed a friend-of-the-court brief in support of the ACLU’s argument that Velez should be granted a new trial. The brief, filed on behalf of Robert P. Schuwerk, a professor at the University of Houston Law Center, Lillian B. Hardwick, a regular consultant and expert witness on legal and judicial ethics in Texas, and Monroe H. Freedman, a professor and former dean at Hofstra University law school who is known as a pioneer in the field of legal ethics, says the conviction of Velez is a miscarriage of justice.

“There is no sugar coating what occurred here,” the brief reads. “Both the defendant’s conviction and his sentence of death are derived from a pervasive course of misconduct on the part of the special prosecutor.”

More information about Velez’s case is available online.

Rabu, 12 Oktober 2011

John Bradley facing local, national criticism now that Michael Morton formally exonerated

The Court of Criminal Appeals today officially added Michael Morton to the list of Texas DNA exonerees. See their order (pdf) and this sampling of MSM coverage:
At Time magazine, columnist Mark Benjamin offers up an item wondering if Williamson County DA John Bradley's efforts fighting Morton's DNA testing and the release of exculpatory records, as well as his role in quashing the investigation into the Todd Willingham case, may reflect poorly on Govenror Perry, who has been Bradley's long-time political patron, noting that efforts to exonerate Mr. Morton:
probably would have sprung [him] from prison years ago were it not for the role of Williamson County District Attorney John Bradley, a well-connected ally of Texas Governor Rick Perry, who fought tenaciously for six years to keep Morton behind bars. Twice a Perry appointee to influential legal posts, Bradley has generated controversy in his handling of two high-profile cases: Morton’s incarceration and the forensic review of evidence against Cameron Todd Willingham, a man who was executed in 2004 despite a cloud of uncertainty around the expert testimony that led to his conviction.

In early 2005, Morton’s attorneys sought DNA testing on a blood-stained bandana found outside the Morton home on the day after the brutal murder, which took place on Aug. 13, 1986. Court records show that Bradley, who was appointed by Perry in 2001 and was not Morton’s original prosecutor, sought to prevent that testing from ever taking place and tried to limit its effect on the case.

At first, Bradley argued that testing the bandana would open the floodgates to an indeterminable amount of new evidence. “One has to wonder whether petitioner would file another motion at some future date seeking additional testing of even more items,” he wrote in October of 2005. In a 2009 filing, Bradley argued that the bandana was irrelevant because it was found “a football field’s length” from the Morton’s house, and that if any DNA testing did take place “it should not incorporate the possibility of a match of any DNA profile recovered from the bandana to a known offender.

District attorneys vary widely in their willingness to consider new evidence, but Bradley’s efforts make him an outlier. The Innocence Project says it has to fight a prosecutor’s objections to DNA testing in less than half of its cases, and most resistance dries up quickly.
Closer to home, the blog Wilco Watchdog looks at the investigation into prosecutorial misconduct in the Morton case, arguing that Bradley shouldn't be involved:
Morton was convicted by a Williamson County jury for murdering his wife and then sentenced to life in prison. But evidence that should have been revealed at trial by prosecutors Ken Anderson (now a district judge in Williamson County) and Mike Davis (a Round Rock lawyer who does work for Williamson County as outside counsel) which clearly exonerates Morton was suppressed.  And other evidence, including a bloody bandana found near the murder scene which contained DNA showing that Morton didn't commit the murder, took years to be tested because Bradley fought hard not to release it and only did so when a Texas appeals court forced his hand.
And now Bradley, who admits to a close friendship with Anderson, is trying to insert himself into the case. Bradley himself is responsible for sequestering important evidence which, if released many years ago, would have allowed Morton to leave prison then, not last week.  It would have also allowed law enforcement agencies to look for the prime suspect, whose name is known from the DNA on the bandana and DNA from another murder committed in Austin a year after Morton went to prison. The same suspect who is still at large. Bradley’s actions not only cost tax payers hundreds of thousands of dollars, but more importantly, it cost an innocent man his freedom for several additional years.
Bradley maintains he was not a prosecutor on the original case in 1986 stating “the ink on my law degree was barely dry”.  However, in 2008, Morton’s lawyers received a transcript between Christine Morton’s mother and Det. Sgt. Wood regarding a conversation between her and Morton’s son.  This information was received after a Texas open records request was filed over the objections of Bradley who also fought the release of this information. Morton’s attorneys also found a summary of the telephone transcript in a district attorney case file marked "trial documents” leading many to believe Bradley was fully aware the evidence existed.
Morton's lawyers argue that withholding the transcript violated the U.S. Constitution by trampling Morton's right to fair treatment by the legal system and his right to view prosecution evidence that could cast doubt on his guilt.
His knowledge of the note about Christine Morton's credit card being used after the murder, the forged endorsement on the check cashed after the murder, and the transcript with the eyewitness account stating that Morton wasn't the killer, all of which were held in Bradley's files, raise the serious question as to why Bradley sought to keep such evidence under wraps.  Because of Bradley's unexplained attempts to sequester this evidence, Bradley, of all people, should not be involved in any follow-up investigation of prosecutorial misconduct.
Even in the absence of all of the evidence that Bradley sequestered, Bradley's friendship with Anderson alone is enough, in and of itself, to kick Bradley off the case involving prosecutorial misconduct.
A special prosecutor should investigate all the front-line suspects involving the misconduct, including Anderson, Davis, Bradley, and Detective Don Wood.
Hear, hear! I couldn't agree more. The Watchdog also linked to an editorial (pdf) in the Williamson County Sun that quoted Bradley saying he was "proud" of his office's involvement in the Morton case, but the editorial writer the added:
Mr. Bradley should feel ashamed. His efforts to stymie DNA testing, along with his refusal to hand over exculpatory documents to defense attorneys, may have had consequences far beyond the wrongful conviction of Michael Morton.

An unnamed man's DNA is now connected to two remarkably similar murder scenes within miles of each other: Ms. Morton's in 1986 and Debra Baker's in 1988.

That mystery man, a violent criminal who may still be at large, may have had many more chances to kill again as Mr. Morton languished in jail. That is a terrifying thought.

Still, Mr. Bradley seems more interested in protecting his reputation than in bringing the real killer to justice.
Strong words, but IMO completely justified, and I'm glad Bradley's hometown media is calling him out on the topic instead of circling the wagons to defend the local good ol' boy network. Competing perhaps only with the Anthony Graves debacle and a handful of others, this was among the most disgraceful displays of Texas prosecutors playing hide the ball in a serious case - over a 25 year stretch, no less - that I'm personally aware of, and Grits pays more attention to these topics than most.

Congrats to Mr. Morton, his family and all the attorneys and advocates who worked on this case for years. Morton's exoneration is a tremendous, if belated blow struck in the name of justice, particularly because those in Williamson County charged with seeking justice were the ones most actively standing in the way of achieving it.

Now it's time for the State Bar to get busy and actually ensure that there are personal and professional consequences for those men, both because they deserve to face consequences for their actions and to set an example for other prosecutors around the state engaging in similar behavior.

Texas high criminal court overturns life sentence on Brady violation

Having recently been discussing "Brady violations" (failure to reveal exculpatory evidence) by prosecutors, Grits should mention a notable Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision from September overturning a marijuana conviction that resulted in a life sentence because of a Brady claim. In State v. Pena, a unanimous court said the prosecution erred by editing out a portion of audio on a video from a traffic stop in which the defendant discussed issues that go to his intent to possess marijuana vs. hemp for producing rope. The state also destroyed the evidence without a court order and without making it available to the defense for independent testing.

The Waco Court of Appeals had ruled "that Appellant knew of the existence and content of his statement in the videotape since he was there when it was made," so no harm, no foul. Speaking for the CCA, though, Judge Barbara Hervey disagreed:
Law enforcement, unbeknownst to Appellant, recorded the videotape, and the State denied outright that the videotape had audio. So although Appellant might have known of his exculpatory statements, as he maintained all along that he had requested testing of the plant material and continuously denied that it was marijuana, he was unaware that an audio recording existed that captured those very remarks, among others. ... Therefore, the court of appeals erred in holding that Brady was not applicable in this case. The duty to disclose existed because the audio recording was known to the State but unknown to Appellant, supported his defense, and the State failed to disclose the audio portion of the videotape.
I'm glad to see the CCA paying more rigorous attention to Brady claims, and am especially surprised and pleased to see a unanimous court sign off on the ruling ordering a new trial. I wouldn't have been surprised, based on their past rulings, if the CCA had held that the failure to disclose was "harmless," but when you're talking about a life sentence, "harm" is in the eye of the beholder.

Rabu, 05 Oktober 2011

Court of Criminal Appeals: Trial court abused discretion by disallowing eyewitness ID expert

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals today issued a remarkable, unanimous opinion (pdf) reversing the judgment of the 14th Court of Criminal Appeals (Houston) to hold that a trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to allow expert witness testimony by Dr. Roy Malpass of the University of Texas at El Paso about the potential pitfalls of eyewitness identification in a capital murder case.

The opinion (State v. Tillman), authored by Judge Barbara Hervey, cited the host of false convictions based on faulty eyewitness identifications discovered through DNA exonerations, as well as a well-developed body of scientific research critiquing over-reliance on eyewitness identification errors:
Nationwide, 190 of the first 250 DNA exonerations involved eyewitnesses who were wrong. BRANDON L. GARRETT, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong 8-9, 279 (2011). In Texas, reports indicate 80 percent of the first 40 DNA exonerations involved an eyewitness identification error. Innocence Project of Texas, Texas Exonerations–At a Glance (2011), http://ipoftexas.org/index.php?action=at-a-glance.

In a recent opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, New Jersey v. Henderson, 2011 N.J. LEXIS 927 (N.J. Aug. 24, 2011), the court focused on the reliability of an eyewitness identification. The New Jersey court discussed the broad consensus within the scientific community on the relevant scientific issues. Id. at 113-15. Specifically, the court referred to the results of a 2001 survey of sixty-four experts, mostly cognitive and social psychologists:
Ninety percent or more of the experts found research on the following topics reliable: suggestive wording; lineup instruction bias; confidence malleability; mugshot bias; post-event information; child suggestivity; alcohol intoxication; and own-race bias. . . . Seventy to 87% found the following research reliable: weapon focus; the accuracy-confidence relationship; memory decay; exposure time; sequential presentation; showups; description-matched foils; child-witness accuracy; and lineup fairness.” Id. at 113-14 (citing Saul M. Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research: A New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405, 407 (2001)).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey went on to note that, in the ten years since the Kassin study, the consensus that the study of eyewitness identification is a reliable field of research has continued to grow. Id. at 114-15. And the court highlighted that law enforcement and reform agencies throughout the country have taken note of the scientific community’s findings, forming task forces and developing new procedures to improve the reliability of eyewitness identifications. Id. at *115-21. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on another case involving the reliability of eyewitness identification. Perry v. New Hampshire, 79 U.S.L.W. 3672 (U.S. May 31, 2011) (No. 10-8974).
In this instance, the witness in question first viewed a photo spread including the suspect and failed to identify him, but a week later viewed a live lineup including the same man and identified him there. Malpass would have testified that the process was overly suggestive because the witness could have remembered the man from the earlier photo spread instead of from the crime event. According to Malpass, more than 30 studies have studied that specific scenario and concluded that it contributed to higher error rates.

The appellate court's ruling was reversed and the opinion was sent back to them for a harm analysis, but this is the first time the Court of Criminal Appeals has overruled a trial court's exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness identification errors based on an "abuse of discretion" standard, which means we may expect such testimony to be allowed in courtrooms much more frequently in the future. The CCA said that such testimony may not be relevant in all cases involving eyewitnesses, but where the scientific research "fits" closely with the facts of the case, it must be allowed.

MORE (10/6): From the Fort Worth Star-Telegram and the Dallas News.